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Ellen D. Katz 
Mission Accomplished? 
Is Texas really worse than Ohio? Comparing the two—and, more broadly, 
the regions subject to the renewed Voting Rights Act with those that are 
exempt—provides critical support for the statute’s validity. 
My study of voting rights violations nationwide suggests that voting 
problems are more prevalent in places “covered” by the Act than elsewhere.1 
Professor Persily’s careful and measured defense of the renewed statute posits 
that this evidence is the best available to support reauthorization.2 The 
evidence matters because if, as critics charge, the regional provisions of the 
Voting Rights Act (VRA) are no longer needed, minority voters should 
confront fewer obstacles to political participation in places where additional 
federal safeguards protect minority interests than in places where these 
safeguards do not operate. In fact, minority voters confront more. 
Places like Texas—unlike places like Ohio—must get approval, or 
“preclearance,” from the federal government before changing any aspect of 
their voting practices.3 Known as section 5, this requirement rests on the 
presumption that changes to voting practices in regions with a history of 
discrimination in voting are discriminatory until local officials persuade federal 
authorities otherwise.4 
 
1.  See Ellen Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination in Voting: Judicial Findings Under Section 2 of 
the Voting Rights Act Since 1982, 39 MICH. J.L. REFORM 643 (2006) [hereinafter Katz et al., 
Documenting Discrimination]; Ellen D. Katz, Not Like the South? Regional Variation and 
Political Participation Through the Lens of Section 2, in VOTING RIGHTS ACT REAUTHORIZATION 
OF 2006: PERSPECTIVES ON DEMOCRACY, PARTICIPATION, AND POWER 183, 187, 208 (Ana 
Henderson ed., 2007) [hereinafter Katz, Not Like the South?]. 
2.  Nathaniel Persily, The Promise and Pitfalls of the New Voting Rights Act, 117 YALE L.J. 174, 194-
96, 202-03, 207 (2007). 
3.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2000). 
4.  See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 327 (1966). 
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Many people think this presumption is no longer appropriate.5 “Times 
have changed,” posits the complaint in a pending lawsuit, and “long . . . 
remedied” are the conditions that once justified the imposition of a remedy as 
burdensome as preclearance.6 
Times have indeed changed. Systematic state-sponsored discrimination 
openly directed at minority voters is no longer the norm and has not been for a 
long time. Adjudicated constitutional violations related to voting are relatively 
rare, minority voters now register and turn out at rates that compare favorably 
with those reported both nationally and in regions not subject to section 5, and 
voters now routinely elect minority candidates to local, state, and federal 
office.7 
Remarkable progress to be sure, but is it enough to declare victory and 
throw out section 5? The Supreme Court would likely think so had Congress 
attempted to impose preclearance on covered jurisdictions for the first time 
only last year. The record Congress amassed to support the 2006 
reauthorization of section 5 does not appear to document the type of 
widespread unconstitutional conduct the Justices have said must underlie the 
passage of new civil rights legislation.8 Insufficient evidence of rampant 
unconstitutional conduct led the Court to toss out six federal statutes over the 
last decade, statutes that sought to do things like promote religious freedom 
and remedy gender-motivated violence.9 
Section 5, however, is not new. It was legitimately put in place more than 
forty years ago to address precisely the type of pervasive discrimination the 
 
5.  See Katz, Not Like the South?, supra note 1, at 184 n.4 (citing opposition to reauthorization); 
Persily, supra note 2, at 182 n.21 (same). 
6.  Complaint at 6, Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. Gonzales, No. 1:06-cv-01284-PLF 
(D.D.C. Aug. 4, 2006). 
7.  Persily, supra note 2, at 197, 199, 201-02. 
8.  Id. at 193-94. 
9.  Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368 (2001) (striking down attempted abrogation of state 
immunity in the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,111-12,117 (2000)); United 
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 614-19 (2000) (rejecting congressional power to subject 
private parties to liability under the Violence Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C. § 13,981 
(2000)); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 88-92 (2000) (striking down attempted 
abrogation of state immunity in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 
621-634 (2000)); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 
666, 672-75 (1999) (same, for the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act, Pub. L. No. 102-
542, 106 Stat. 3567 (1992) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.)); Fla. 
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 640-47 (1999) 
(same, for the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 
271(h), 296 (2000)); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530-32 (1997) (striking down the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2000)). 
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Court now requires as justification for new legislation.10 The continued 
legitimacy of section 5 should therefore not depend on evidence that such 
discrimination persists largely unchanged. If it did, Congress could reauthorize 
preclearance only if the statute were a failure.11 
No one thinks section 5 has been a failure. What is disputed is the scope of 
its success. Has section 5’s efficacy in suppressing acts of discrimination 
brought about lasting changes in behavior and attitude such that section 5 
could be scrapped without consequence? Or is the progress we have made 
fragile and dependent on section 5 continuing to block and deter misconduct 
that would find expression in its absence? 
Nobody can know what would happen if the strictures of preclearance were 
lifted. Comparing covered and noncovered jurisdictions nevertheless suggests 
that section 5 is far from obsolete. My examination of claims brought under the 
core permanent provision of the VRA—known as “section 2”12—shows that 
minority voters remain more likely to confront obstacles to political 
participation in jurisdictions subject to section 5 than elsewhere. Plaintiffs 
bringing section 2 claims have been more likely to succeed,13 and remain more 
likely to succeed, than plaintiffs elsewhere.14 Courts hearing section 2 claims 
have been more likely to find intentional discrimination, extreme racial 
polarization in voting, and a lack of success by minority candidates in covered 
regions than in noncovered ones.15 Covered jurisdictions also account for the 
majority of the reported section 2 lawsuits in which plaintiffs achieved 
successful outcomes since 1982.16 
 
10.  See, e.g., City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518 (citing decisions upholding section 5 as examples of 
permissible enforcement legislation). 
11.  See Katz, Not Like the South?, supra note 1, at 185, 208. 
12.  42 U.S.C. § 1973a (2000). 
13.  See Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination, supra note 1; Katz, Not Like the South?, supra note 
1, at 185, 208. 
14.  Even as the total number of successful section 2 lawsuits nationwide has declined in recent 
years, plaintiffs remain more likely to succeed in covered jurisdictions. Between 1996 and 
2005, plaintiffs in covered jurisdictions prevailed in 27.8% of the lawsuits filed, compared 
with a 21.5% success rate for plaintiffs in noncovered jurisdictions during this same period. 
To be sure, decisions from the early 2000s suggest this gap is closing, but the pace of 
litigation following post-census redistricting suggests that data from partial decades, and 
indeed, the early part of any decade may not be representative of the decade as a whole. 
15.  See Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination, supra note 1; Katz, Not Like the South?, supra note 
1, at 185, 208. On minority electoral success, compare Persily, supra note 2, at 199 (“Nothing 
in the record, however, pointed to a difference in rates of minority officeholding between 
covered and uncovered jurisdictions.”). 
16.  See Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination, supra note 1, at 655-56 (noting sixty-eight 
successful plaintiffs’ outcomes in covered jurisdictions and fifty-five elsewhere). 
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Professor Persily relies on this evidence to distinguish covered from 
noncovered jurisdictions and as support for the reauthorization of section 5’s 
strictures exclusively in covered jurisdictions.17 In my view, comparing covered 
with noncovered jurisdictions is most valuable because the comparison offers a 
concrete way to measure section 5’s success in covered jurisdictions. The 
section 2 data in particular provide a lens through which to gauge the extent to 
which section 5’s success in controlling manifestations of racial discrimination 
amounts to a cure for the underlying disease.18 
Section 2 and section 5 are not coextensive,19 but they are not wholly 
distinct, and a large number of electoral practices run afoul of both provisions. 
Where they overlap, preclearance should block implementation of the offensive 
practice and eliminate the need for plaintiffs to challenge it under section 2. In 
fact, section 5 has done just that. Both before 1997, when the Department of 
Justice viewed a violation of section 2 as reason to deny preclearance under 
section 5,20 and since then, when overlap in substance has supported the same 
result, section 5 has blocked implementation of many electoral practices that 
would have likely prompted a successful section 2 challenge. 
This particular screening effect explains why, for example, three-judge trial 
panels decided more than four times as many section 2 cases in noncovered 
jurisdictions as in covered ones since 1982. In covered regions during this 
period, the Justice Department denied preclearance to dozens of districting 
plans of the type that, if challenged under section 2, would have been most 
 
17.  Persily, supra note 2, at 207 (“[Section 2 case data] provides the best systematic evidence to 
distinguish covered from noncovered jurisdictions [and] will provide the greatest help for a 
court wishing to hang its hat on systematic data that justifies the current coverage 
formula.”). 
18.  See Pamela S. Karlan, Section 5 Squared: Congressional Power To Extend and Amend the Voting 
Rights Act, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 31 (2007); Ellen D. Katz, Congressional Power To Extend 
Preclearance: A Response to Professor Karlan, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 33, 37 (2007). 
19.  Unlike section 5, section 2 applies nationwide and importantly presumes state action to be 
valid absent proof establishing a statutory violation. Section 2 prohibits some conduct that 
might pass muster under section 5 and permits various practices for which preclearance 
would be denied. See Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003) (holding that a districting 
plan’s apparent compliance with section 2 does not establish that preclearance is warranted 
under section 5); Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471 (1997) (holding that an 
apparent violation of section 2 is not grounds to deny preclearance under section 5). 
20.  Revision of Procedures for the Administration of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 
52 Fed. Reg. 486 (Jan. 6, 1987) (codified at 28 C.F.R. § 51.55(b) (2007)) (providing 
Department of Justice regulation instructing that preclearance be denied to any “clear 
violation of Section 2”); see also S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 12 n.31 (1982), reprinted in 1982 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 189 (“In light of the amendment to section 2, it is intended that a section 
5 objection also follow if a new voting procedure itself so discriminates as to violate section 
2.”). The Supreme Court invalidated this policy in Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board, 520 
U.S. 471 (1997). 
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likely to be heard by a three-judge panel.21 Comparably few such section 2 
claims materialized in covered jurisdictions precisely because section 5 blocked 
implementation of the underlying plans.22 
By definition, section 5 screens conduct only in covered jurisdictions. As a 
result, if these jurisdictions have been “cured,” they should account for fewer 
successful section 2 lawsuits than noncovered ones, where section 5 does not 
operate. But this is not the case. Section 2 plaintiffs have been more likely to 
succeed and in fact have succeeded more often in covered jurisdictions. Even at 
the local level, where preclearance operates most vigorously to block electoral 
changes,23 section 2 challenges have been more likely to succeed in covered than 
in noncovered jurisdictions.24 
One can of course “quibble” with the section 2 data.25 My study did not 
track section 2 lawsuits that failed to produce published opinions nor did it 
control for things like judicial predilections for interpreting the VRA narrowly 
or expansively. The results might accordingly be challenged to the extent that 
factors such as these vary systematically between covered and non-covered 
jurisdictions in a manner that offers an alternative explanation for the 
disparities observed. 
What we do know, however, suggests that a fuller accounting of section 2 
litigation would reveal an even greater proportion and number of successful 
plaintiff outcomes in covered jurisdictions than in noncovered ones. First, we 
know that many section 2 claims end with settlements that offer plaintiffs 
substantial relief but no fully adjudicated—or published—judgment.26 The 
total number of such settlements is not known, but nothing suggests that 
noncovered jurisdictions account for a greater number of them. In fact, just the 
opposite appears to be true. Dillard v. Crenshaw County,27 for example, involved 
a successful section 2 challenge to the use of at-large elections in several 
Alabama counties. Dillard prompted challenges to similar practices in an 
additional 180 Alabama jurisdictions, most of which settled in a manner 
 
21.  28 U.S.C. § 2284(a) (2000) (providing that three-judge trial panels are to be convened to 
hear challenges to the constitutionality of statewide or congressional apportionment plans). 
22.  Ellen D. Katz & Anna Baldwin, Why Counting Votes Doesn’t Add Up: A Response to Cox and 
Miles’ Judging the Voting Rights Act, 108 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR (forthcoming 2008). 
23.  See Michael J. Pitts, Let’s Not Call the Whole Thing Off Just Yet: A Response to Samuel 
Issacharoff’s Suggestion To Scuttle Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 84 NEB. L. REV. 605, 612 
(2005) (arguing that the greatest impact of Section 5 and the VRA has been to police voting 
discrimination at the local level). 
24.  See Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination, supra note 1, at 655. 
25.  Persily, supra note 2, at 206. 
26.  See Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination, supra note 1, at 654-55. 
27.  640 F. Supp. 1347 (M.D. Ala. 1986). 
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favorable to the plaintiffs.28 The record of published section 2 cases in Alabama 
captures but a fraction of the statute’s true effect in this covered state. 
Second, while judicial proclivities might explain the greater proportion and 
number of successful section 2 claims in covered jurisdictions, they would do 
so only to the extent that the judges most likely to favor liability decided a 
disproportionate number of the cases in these jurisdictions. To be sure, some 
judges have been more likely to favor liability than others. In particular, judges 
who are African American or who were appointed by Democratic presidents 
have been more likely to vote for liability than their white and Republican 
colleagues. But these judges were not disproportionately located in covered 
jurisdictions.29 
Third, while the number of successful lawsuits does not indicate the 
severity of the underlying statutory violations, the section 2 violations 
identified in covered jurisdictions appear to be more clear-cut and less 
vulnerable to challenge than those found in noncovered regions. Section 2 
defendants were more likely to prevail on appeal in noncovered jurisdictions 
than in covered ones, while plaintiff-initiated appeals were more likely to 
succeed in covered regions. This suggests that trial judges in covered 
jurisdictions, if anything, appear to have read Section 2 too restrictively.30 
Release from section 5 should not require covered jurisdictions to get rid of 
every vestige of past discrimination. Nor should these jurisdictions be required 
to eliminate the prospect of future misconduct. But the section 2 evidence 
suggests that regions subject to section 5 have not done enough to dismantle 
obstacles to minority political participation. The evidence suggests that they 
must do more than they have before conventional legal remedies will suffice to 
address the problems that arise everywhere. Only then will section 5 have 
accomplished its mission. We are not there yet. 
 
Ellen D. Katz is Professor of Law at University of Michigan Law School. 
 
Preferred Citation: Ellen D. Katz, Mission Accomplished?, 117 Yale L.J. 
Pocket Part 142 (2007), http://thepocketpart.org/2007/12/10/katz.html. 
 
28.  See Peyton McCrary et al., Alabama, in QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE IMPACT OF 
THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, 1965-1990, at 38, 53-54 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman 
eds., 1994). 
29.  See Katz & Baldwin, supra note 22; cf. Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judging the Voting 
Rights Act, 108 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (noting judicial proclivities). 
30.  See Katz & Baldwin, supra note 22. 
